Ratchanon (Brighton) Chotiputsilp

Working Papers

Subsidy, Shirking, and Strategy: Assessing the Effects of Consumption Subsidy on Worker Effort and Intervening Strategy (Job Market Paper) (Click for Draft)

I study how workers and managers in a firm respond to a temporary government consumption subsidy program. Using exogenous variation in eligibility criteria, I show that workers who become eligible for the program reduce their effort at work and shirk more. As a result, these workers earn less in performance-based pay, leading to a net decrease in their overall take-home pay. Additionally, I find that managers strategically intervene to mitigate the impact of diminished worker efforts on overall production efficiency. Managers reallocate more difficult tasks to non-shirking workers while assigning less demanding tasks to those who reduce their effort. In addition to task reallocation, managers also implement stricter disciplinary measures to address shirking behavior. This study highlights the potential unintended consequences of the consumption subsidy program on both worker and firm outcomes and underscores the importance of management in safeguarding productivity and efficiency in response to shocks.

Presentation: PhD Seminar Erasmus University (November 2023) Bank of Thailand (March 2024), Thammasat University (March 2024), PSE-CEPR (June 2024), ZEW 'Research with and within Organizations" (Sep 2024), AYEW (October 2024), ESE (November 2024)

The Cost of Salary Negotiation: An Experimental Evaluation with Job Seekers in Thailand (With Taeho Kim) (Click for Draft)

R&R at ILR Review (2026)

The persistent gender pay gap is often linked to women avoiding competitive activities, particularly salary negotiation. Despite initiatives aimed at promoting negotiation skills, the impact of such skills on labor market outcomes remains unclear. In our field experiment with real job seekers, we introduced two interventions: negotiation training combined with the provision of market wage information and the provision of wage information alone. Following the intervention, we evaluated salaries and non-salary benefits through an obfuscated survey. Although the training increased negotiation frequency, it resulted in reduced salaries and employment propensity, particularly for women. The most consistent explanation for these declines appears to be social backlash against negotiation.

Presentation: KU Leuven LEER (April 2022), SOLE (May 2022)

Gender, Negotiation and Employer Demand (with Taeho Kim and Clémentine Van Effenterre) (Click for Draft)

Funding: Russell Sage Foundation [grant numbers R-2305-43674]

Abstract:

We study how candidates' negotiation behavior shapes employer decisions using a field experiment in which 493 professional recruiters evaluated more than 7,000 job applications and counteroffers. Negotiation updates employer beliefs about both outside options and productivity. Employers revise outside-option beliefs similarly for male and female candidates, and wage gains from intensive negotiation are similar across genders. However, employers revise productivity upward for men and not for women. As a result, more intensive negotiation increases recommendations for higher-level roles substantially more for men than for women, and female candidates face larger increases in rejection rates than comparable male candidates. Combining these effects, we estimate optimal counteroffers of 11--12 percent above the initial offer for women and 20--30 percent for men. Pay transparency attenuates gender differences in the returns to negotiation in higher-level role recommendations by constraining recruiter discretion.

Presentation: AFE(2024) SOLE(2025)

Job Rotation and Worker Performance (With Mitchell Hoffman, Taeho Kim, and Shing-Yi Wang) (Click for draft)

Funding: The Connaught Grant [grant numbers 517417, 2023].

Accepted based on Pre-results Review, Journal of Development Economics;

Final publication venue is unknown

Pre-registered Report Abstract:

How should firms allocate workers to jobs? A standard approach is for firms to assign workers to jobs and to train workers for one job. An alternative approach is for firms to rotate workers to different jobs while providing training for multiple jobs. This study investigates the impact of job rotation on worker allocation and efficiency within a garment manufacturing firm in Asia. In this randomized controlled trial, the control group follows the standard, pre-existing practice at the firm, receiving training for and assignment to one job. In the treatment group, workers undergo training for multiple jobs. After training, preferences of both workers and managers guide permanent job assignments using a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm. We examine how the treatment affects performance, employee turnover, work satisfaction, and job preference discovery.

Work in Progress

Worker Perceptions of Young Firms (with Mikael Paaso)

Presentations at conferences: American Economic Association, INSEAD Doriot Entrepreneurship Conference

Seminars: Erasmus University Rotterdam

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