Working Papers
Working Papers
Presentation: KU Leuven LEER (April 2022), SOLE (May 2022)
Gender, Negotiation and Employer Demand (with Taeho Kim and Clémentine Van Effenterre) (Click for Draft)
Funding: Russell Sage Foundation [grant numbers R-2305-43674]
Abstract:
A widely-held explanation for the gender pay gap suggests that women tend to shy away from competitive activities like negotiation, potentially limiting their labor market outcomes. But would women benefit from negotiating more? In this study, we examine employers' perceptions and negotiation behavior through a two-sided field experiment in which we hired 493 professional recruiters to evaluate fictitious job applications and negotiate counteroffers. We find that, while female candidates are not necessarily disadvantaged in overall evaluations compared to male candidates, gendered differences emerge when candidates negotiate more intensively. Female candidates who ask for more are significantly more likely to have their candidacy rejected, with an increase of 2.7 percentage points, and are 3.4 percentage points less likely to be recommended for senior positions compared to male candidates, who instead benefit from increased senior role recommendations. We find no evidence that these differences are driven by recruiters' estimates of candidates' current salaries, outside options, or perceived commitment to the firm. Rather, the most consistent explanation appears to be differential signal assessments of negotiation, with male candidates benefiting from skill assessments linked to intensive negotiation, while such benefits do not accrue to female candidates. Finally, we do not find evidence that pay transparency affects these negotiation disparities.
Presentation: AFE(2024)
Job Rotation and Worker Performance (With Mitchell Hoffman, Taeho Kim, and Shing-Yi Wang) (Click for draft)
Funding: The Connaught Grant [grant numbers 517417, 2023].
Accepted based on Pre-results Review, Journal of Development Economics;
Final publication venue is unknown
Pre-registered Report Abstract:
How should firms allocate workers to jobs? A standard approach is for firms to assign workers to jobs and to train workers for one job. An alternative approach is for firms to rotate workers to different jobs while providing training for multiple jobs. This study investigates the impact of job rotation on worker allocation and efficiency within a garment manufacturing firm in Asia. In this randomized controlled trial, the control group follows the standard, pre-existing practice at the firm, receiving training for and assignment to one job. In the treatment group, workers undergo training for multiple jobs. After training, preferences of both workers and managers guide permanent job assignments using a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm. We examine how the treatment affects performance, employee turnover, work satisfaction, and job preference discovery.
Worker Perceptions of Young Firms (with Mikael Paaso)
Presentations at conferences: American Economic Association, INSEAD Doriot Entrepreneurship Conference
Seminars: Erasmus University Rotterdam